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1. INTRODUCTION
Electricity generation from renewable energy sources
(RES-E) is supported in many countries around the
world. In the European Union, every Member State has
established a dedicated policy programme for financial
support of RES-E [1]. Ever since the first support
schemes were designed by policy makers some decades
ago, there is an ongoing debate about which policy
instruments and which design options are most suitable
for reaching the targeted deployment of renewable
energies.
This paper contributes to this debate by exploring
risk implications of policy instruments and by analysing
the impact of policy choices on incentives for private
investors. This perspective is especially relevant in
liberalised markets. Here, policy making must ensure
that adequate incentives are given to private investors if
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specific RES-E targets are to be achieved. To design
policies that are effective (in terms of target
achievement) and efficient (in terms of ensuring the
highest social welfare), policy makers must look beyond
costs and (amongst other things) consider all aspects of
profitability that are of concern for private investors,
including risk aspects and other effects on cost of capital
(see also [2]). Such a focus on profitability and risk
rather than on costs is crucial for designing policies that
create adequate investment incentives. Therefore, this
paper uses a stochastic discounted cash flow approach to
model average profitability (i.e. net present values) as
well as risks (i.e. probability distributions of net present
values). Using an extended financing and investment
decision model we identify the impact of increased risks
on renewable investments and thus on the required
renewable support. Thereby we go beyond standard
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finance models which focus exclusively on systematic
risk, i.e. risks that are correlated with overall market
returns. Such standard approach would provide adequate
results for perfectly diversified investors. Yet renewable
investors frequently do not have a perfectly diversified
portfolio. We therefore acknowledge the relevance of
non-systematic risk (sometimes called idiosyncratic
risk) by explicitly modelling liquidity management.
Liquidity management should be a key concern for
companies in the presence of systematic and
unsystematic financial risk if financial illiquidity is
costly. Thus we develop a more realistic model of
investor behaviour which allows assessing the impact of
support scheme design on investment decisions. With
such insight, policy makers are able to make more
informed decisions about required support levels and to
evaluate the consequences of e.g. switching from one
policy instrument to another.
In Europe, fixed feed-in tariffs (FIT) are the dominant
policy instrument applied for the support of RES-E [1].
With an increasing share of variable RES-E in the
system and an increasing pressure to improve market
integration of RES-E, many countries have now started
to re-evaluate the use of traditional FIT schemes. Some
have already implemented alternatives, mostly in form
of feed-in premiums (FIP) [1]. A counter-argument
frequently put forward against FIP is that this instrument
exposes RES-E investors to higher risk (see [3]). In this
paper, we do not investigate which policy instrument is
to be preferred. Instead, we take the ongoing policy
trend in Europe as a starting point and develop a general
approach to analyse the implications of exposing
investors to higher market risk. We then use the
developed approach to analyse the switching from a FIT
to a FIP scheme and quantify the consequences
regarding investment attractiveness and required
support payments for the case of an offshore wind
investment in Germany.
The developed model aims at a theoretically
consistent approach, drawing from different aspects of
financial theory, along with an empirically sound
parametrisation. The standard model for dealing with
risk in investment analysis is the Capital Asset Pricing
Model (CAPM), developed by Sharpe, Lintner, and
Mossin ([4-6]), which determines systematic risk and
cost of capital based on the correlation of asset return
with the market. We consider systematic risk based on
the CAPM approach. In addition to that, we also
consider unsystematic risk. We diverge from the
standard approach here by assuming that investors may
accrue cost from avoiding financial distress. In this, we
draw from the approach developed by Schober et al. [7].
The contributions of this paper are threefold: 1) We
expand the framework of Schober et al. [7], who
assessed the impact of unsystematic risk via liquidity
management for a single year, by developing a multi-
year approach; 2) We apply the framework to a new
area, namely investments in renewable energy projects
under different support schemes; 3) We quantify the
consequences of different risk exposures for a concrete
case, an offshore wind park in Germany.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In
Section 2, we describe the background for our analysis,
including the relation to financial theory, the general
DCF approach and the relevant support instruments. In
Section 3, we introduce our methodology, including the
model structure, the modelling of stochastic processes,
the modelling of liquidity management, and the beta
analysis for the CAPM. In Section 4, we apply the
model to a specific case, namely a German offshore
wind park in the Baltic Sea. We discuss the results in
Section 5 and conclude with Section 6.
2. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS: INVESTMENT
RISK
2.1. Standard financial theory and systematic vs.
unsystematic risk
A basic assumption of standard financial theory and
portfolio selection theory, as formulated by Markowitz
in 1952, is that risk and return are the only - and equally
important - factors to consider in investment appraisal
[8]. Later, Sharpe and Lintner [4,5] showed that firms
should only be concerned with systematic risks when
considering investment in new assets. This is, because it
is assumed that perfect portfolio diversification can be
obtained at shareholder level without transaction costs.
This also implies that a firm should not undertake costly
measures to avoid bankruptcy as, in perfect markets
without transaction costs, old firms can go bankrupt and
new firms can be established immediately at no loss. In
reality, however, costs of bankruptcy can be substantial
and irreversible [9]: They can include loss of market
share, inefficient asset sales, foregone investment
opportunities, and more. In the presence of transaction
costs, the generally agreed assumption of financial
theory that investors are risk-averse (see [10]) predicts
that investors are willing to take action against risk
exposure, by implementing safety measures. Firms are
thus often willing to undertake costly measures to avoid
economic and financial distress [11].
In newer developments of financial analysis, risks
other than systematic market risk are being
acknowledged. Further risk factors are incorporated, e.g.
in the three-factor model by Fama and French [12], with
the argument that market imperfections (and
consequential diversification constraints) as well as
transaction costs make more types of risk costly. The
choice of model can have significant implications on the
valuation of investment projects. Empirical studies have
found that required returns on equity may differ by 2%
and more between the CAPM and the Fama-French-
Model [13,14].
Also for renewable assets, we expect that both
systematic and unsystematic risks are relevant for
investment decisions, because of transaction costs and
irreversibility effects. We thus acknowledge that failures
(e.g. bankruptcy) are costly to investors, and incorporate
them into the analysis. Our model is therefore based on
a net cash flow approach with risk modelling at two
levels: 1) systematic risk, which stems from market risks
and influences the cost of capital; and 2) unsystematic
risk, which affects the required capital basis for an
investment. More specifically, we assume that firms use
liquidity reserves to mitigate their exposure to risk of
financial distress. A greater variation in profit will
generally require higher liquidity reserves. We thus
expect that a support mechanism which mitigates
variation in profits the most leads to the lowest required
liquidity reserves and thus highest expected returns or
lowest required support levels.
A challenge with unsystematic risks is, however, that
they are mostly in-transparent and specific for an
individual firm. We therefore revert to an application
case showing the concrete effects in a specific setting.
2.2. Discounted cash flow evaluation of an
investment
The standard method for evaluating investments is the
discounted cash flow (DCF) approach (see e.g. [15]). In
this approach, all positive and negative cash flows
related to the respective investment project are
simulated, discounted with the applicable rate for the
cost of capital, and summed up, as shown in Eq. (1):
(1)
where I0 are the investment costs, Rt are the revenues, Ct
are the operational costs, r is the discount rate (cost of
capital), and T is the project lifetime.
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If the resulting net present value (NPV) of a project is
positive, then the investment should be undertaken. Since
many of the different elements contained in the future
cash flows are not known with exactitude, they have to be
simulated. To account for the uncertainty, many investors
include probability distributions of underlying elements
in their assessment. This is done by e.g. creating different
scenarios or making Monte Carlo simulations.
In principle, all three basic cash flows, namely
revenues Rt, operational cost Ct, and investment cost I0,
can contain uncertainties. We simplify subsequently by
assuming that at the time of investment decision, I0 and
Ct are known and fixed. This may e.g. be achieved
through fixed price contracts. Future revenue streams Rt
are, however, uncertain and can cause variations in the
returns from the project, which induces risk.
Traditional DCF analysis is based solely on standard
financial theory and the assumptions underlying the
CAPM in which only systematic risk is relevant.
Systematic risks are exclusively dealt with through the
cost of capital r. We have argued above that also
unsystematic risks should be accounted for in our type
of analysis. We do this by considering the prevention of
bankruptcy through liquidity management.
Some may argue that a real option approach would be
most appropriate to dealing with risks. This is especially
the case for irreversible decisions (such as investments
with sunk costs) and evaluation of different decision
options (such as operational choices). In this paper, we,
however, deal with a somewhat different kind of risk
exposure: First, our starting point is the assumption that
the investment is politically desired and thus shall be
undertaken - we are merely investigating the effects of
different support schemes on that investment; Second,
the profitability is in our setting mostly unrelated to
operational decisions. We therefore argue that these
kinds of risk are sufficiently addressed by a stochastic
approach as used here, in which we use a DCF analysis
with added risk elements, i.e. liquidity management and
related Monte Carlo simulation. 
2.3. Liquidity management: cash reserves in firms
When considering unsystematic risks in form of risk of
default or bankruptcy in a firm, one should distinguish
between economic and financial distress. Economic
distress occurs at low market asset values relative to
debt and causes insolvency. Financial distress occurs at
low cash reserves relative to current liabilities and leads
to illiquidity. Usually, a firm defaults because of both
factors, but this has not necessarily to be the case.
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Davydenko [11] shows that 13% of defaulting firms in
his sample were insolvent but still liquid, and 10% of
defaulting firms were illiquid but still solvent. In our
theoretical model, we focus on the indicator of financial
distress (and firms avoiding illiquidity), acknowledging
the simplification made. Moreover, we simplify by
assuming that risk of financial distress represents all
unsystematic risks in a firm. Knowing that there might
be additional sources of costly unsystematic risk, our
results can only establish the lower boundary for such
costs. This approach corresponds to the one taken by
Schober et al. [7].
One way of dealing with risk of financial distress is
liquidity management. Liquidity management can take
the form of either expenses for costly hedging (in order
to reduce the risk of low revenues for the firm) or
provision of an additional capital buffer in the firm [7].
We understand liquidity management as the decision to
upholding an optimised level of capital buffer within the
firm to prevent defaulting, i.e. the going concern in
possible illiquid states. A firm has several options to
create a capital buffer: 1) secure bank lines of credit; 2)
establish sufficient cash reserve in the beginning of a
risky project; 3) raise required capital in the short term
from shareholders (through retained earnings or equity
injections).
As discussed by Flannery and Lockhart [16],
uncertainty about access to funds in the future (including
from banks) might lead to excess cash holdings in a
firm. Bates et al. [17] give an overview of the literature's
theories of holding excess cash in firms and show
empirically that excess cash holdings in firms are
common. Thus, we focus on cash reserves and capital
from shareholders in this analysis (and not bank lines of
credit). Because of the time-value of money and tax
effects of cash holdings, a firm will however consider it
optimal to build up cash reserves as late as possible. This
corresponds to the conclusions of Acharya et al. [18],
who find that constrained firms are more likely to save
cash out of cash flows. Therefore, we focus on the third
of the above mentioned options, in which firms raise
capital as late as possible either through retained
earnings (i.e. by saving of incoming cash flows during
operations) or, whenever necessary, by additional equity
injections. This implies that a firm will strive to keep the
liquidity reserve in any year as low as possible - just at
the level needed to avoid financial distress in the next
period with sufficient probability. It should be noted that
liquidity management through cash reserves in the firm
can at best decrease the risk of financial distress to a
desired level, but can never eliminate it completely.
2.4. Support schemes and investment risk
Several different policy instruments can be used to
provide financial support for renewable energy projects.
These span from investment grants over tax breaks to
generation-based support. The latter type is dominant in
Europe [1]. Here, one can distinguish between
instruments that expose renewable producers to market
price risks and those that eliminate or at least reduce
market price risks. During the early implementations of
renewable support, mostly those instruments were
applied that shield renewable producers from market
price signals and thus also market risks [1]. These are for
example fixed feed-in tariffs, where renewable
producers are guaranteed a fixed price for a certain
period (e.g. 20 years).
Eq. (2) illustrates the revenue flows under a feed-in
tariff scheme:
(2)
where qt is the renewable energy production volume per
time period and FIT is the long-term guaranteed tariff
level. Uncertainty stems here solely from the unknown
production volume, which depends on the available
renewable resources in time period t.
More recently, other instruments like quota systems
with tradable green certificates or feed-in premiums are
increasingly applied in Europe [1]. In these schemes,
support is paid out as market add-on. This means that
renewable producers need to sell their production on the
power market and are exposed to its risks. We focus here
on feed-in premiums, under which revenues are
determined as in Eq. (3):
(3)
where qt is the renewable energy production volume in
period t, St is the power price and FIP is the long-term
guaranteed premium level. gt is a weighting factor
(sometimes labelled “market-value factor”) describing
the fact that the average revenue by renewable producers
might be below (or above) the average spot price level.
This thus allows taking into account systematic
correlation between the supported production and the
market price [cf. 19]. Revenue risk stems in this support
R q g S FIPt
FIT
t t t= +( ),
R q FITt
FIT
t= ,
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setting from both the unknown production volume and
the unknown market price.
3. METHODOLOGY
3.1. Model structure
We develop a multi-year cash flow model that estimates
the investment incentives for a wind energy investor
under different risk exposures, and that incorporates
dynamic liquidity management. It is dynamic in the
sense that the liquidity reserve is recalculated each year
depending on the current cash flow situation. However,
it is static in the sense that the cost of capital used for the
liquidity reserve is fixed and does not depend on
previous utilisation.
The purpose of the model is to determine a
Shareholder Value (SHV) after liquidity management
which then can be used to compare the attractiveness of
investment under different scenarios. For transparency
reasons we model a firm that has a single activity: the
investment project throughout the lifetime of the project.
This is also similar to creating a special purpose vehicle
for a project. We thus assume that the SHV of this
project/firm is the key determinant for the investment
decision. Using the SHV we can also derive the
minimum required support level for the specific project
by assuming that the investment threshold is given by an
ex-ante expected SHV of at least zero. Based on these
two indicators (SHV and required support levels),
comparisons between different support scheme designs
can be made.
Figure 1 illustrates the model structure. The model
consists of several parts: a power price model, a wind
production model, the beta analysis (estimating cost of
capital), and the cash flow model (divided into cash
flows before liquidity management and after). All parts
of the model are necessary to be able to adequately
dealing with risk: Power price and wind production
model generate inputs to the cash flow model, which
calculates the cash flows required to determine the
shareholder values. Since the cash flows to shareholder
depend on the liquidity reserve, which in turn depends
on the probability of financial distress, a nested Monte
Carlo simulation approach is required. Probability
distributions and expected values of shareholder values
and support payments are the result of our cash flow
analysis. At the step of discounting the cash flows for
the Shareholder Value, the beta analysis is required to
determine the cost of capital for the shareholders. 
In the following sections, the different components of
the model are explained in detail. Since we aim at
deriving a multi-year investment assessment, we focus
on the stochastic characteristics of annual quantities and
prices, which in turn represent aggregates of shorter-
term (e.g. hourly) values.
3.2. Power price model
For modelling the annual average power prices, we use
the two-factor model developed by Schwartz and Smith
[20]. This two-factor model consists of a long term
process reflecting the uncertainty in the equilibrium
Cash flow model
Support
Payments
Beta analysis
Shareholder
Value
Power price
model
Wind production
model
Cash flows
Cash flows
before liquidity
management
after liquidity
management
Monte Carlo simulation
Risk implications
Monte Carlo simulation
Quantile analysis
Required Reserves
Figure 1: Model structure
price and a short term process reflecting stochastic
shorter term deviations from the equilibrium price. The
logarithm of the overall power price St is obtained as the
sum of the two stochastic components:
(4)
The long term process ξt expresses fundamental
changes in the equilibrium level that are expected to
persist, and reflects the natural logarithm of the long-
run equilibrium level St
—
. Changes in this long-run
equilibrium level may e.g. be related to changing fuel
prices or modifications in the CO2 regime. The
developments over the last decade suggest that these
changes are hardly predictable and that also in the
future, substantial uncertainty will persist. The long
term process then follows an arithmetic Brownian
motion:
(5)
where ξt has drift μξ and volatility σξ. This corresponds,
according to Itô's Lemma, to 
(6)
The long term process can be exactly discretised
using an Euler scheme [21], to: 
(7)
where εt is a random element with εt ~ N(0,1). 
The short term process χt expresses the mean
reverting relation between the current price and the
currently expected long term equilibrium: 
(8)
Its deviations are assumed to revert to zero following
an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process:
(9)
where χt has volatility σχ and mean reversion coefficient κ.
d dt dzt tχ κ χ σ χ χ= − + ,
χ ξt t
t
t t
S
S
S=
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ = −ln ln( ) .
ξ ξ μ σ εξ ξt t t tt t+ = + +Δ Δ Δ ,
dS S dt S dzt t t= +
⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟ +μ σ σξ ξ ξ ξ
1
2
2
.
d dt dztξ μ σξ ξ ξ= + ,
ln( ) .St t t= +ξ χ
The discretisation necessary for simulation is
according to Phillips [22] : 
(10)
where ω– t is a random element with ω– t ~ N(ρχξεt,1–ρ2χξ),
and ρχξεt e [–1,1] represents the correlation of dzξ and dzχ.
For sake of simplicity we set the market value factor gt
to 1. This is also justified by the fact that the market value
factor for offshore wind in Germany has been so far rather
close to 1 and is expected to remain so at least in the near
future [cf. 23].
3.3. Wind power production model
Wind production is modelled in a somewhat simplified
setting by assuming that the wind production of one
period is unrelated to previous or subsequent periods.
We deem this approach appropriate when the model
calculations are based on relatively large time steps t,
such as monthly or yearly periods. Thus focusing on
time-uncorrelated distributions, several studies
emphasise the appropriateness of Weibull distributions.
These are deemed most appropriate for estimating wind
speeds and also wind energy production (see e.g. [24] or
[25]). We thus use a Weibull distribution, directly on the
wind energy production. For the implementation in
simulation, we use the quantile inverse cumulative
distribution function:
(11)
where qt is the stochastic wind power production in
period t, P is the average expected wind power
production from the project, λ is the scale parameter of
the Weibull distribution, k is the shape parameter of the
Weibull distribution, and 0 < εt < 1 is a uniformly
distributed random variable, corresponding to the
quantile of the production distribution function.
3.4. Cash flow model: before and after liquidity
management
As mentioned above, we focus on the shareholder values
and thus use the free cash flow available for
shareholders FCFEt as basis of the evaluation. We
denote the sum of all discounted FCFE after liquidity
management as the Shareholder Value (SHV). This
q Pt t k= − −λ ε( ( )) ,ln 1
1
χ χ σ
κ
ωκ χ
κ
t t t
t
t
te
e
+
−
−
= +
−
Δ
Δ
Δ1
2
2
,
122 International Journal of Sustainable Energy Planning and Management Vol. 07 2015
Support Mechanisms for Renewables: How Risk Exposure Influences Investment Incentives
indicator serves as the basis for comparing the
investment incentives between different cases.
At time of investment (t = 0), FCFE0 consists of cash
flows from investment and financing activities. Total
capital required at project investment is: Ω0 = I0 + L0,
where I0 is the direct investment cost and L0 is the
liquidity reserve that the firm has chosen to establish
from the beginning of the project (if any).
We calculate the free cash flow available for
shareholders before liquidity management for each year
t =1...T as:
(12)
where Rt are the revenues, Ct are the operation and
maintenance cost, θt are the interests paid for interest-
bearing debt, Tt are the payable taxes (based on
revenues, operational costs depreciation and interests),
and Dt are the debt injections (if positive) or the debt
repayments (if negative).
The revenues Rt depend on the production volume,
on the achieved market price, and on the payments from
the support scheme. The revenues under the two
analysed support schemes are defined as in Eq. (2) and
(3). The operation and maintenance cost Ct are in our
model deterministic and fixed costs, but in principle
they can also be modelled as stochastic, if necessary.
The interest bearing debt is calculated as follows: In the
year of investment, a loan corresponding to a certain
percentage of total investment Ω0 is taken, which is
then repaid on an annuity basis over a predefined
amount of years.
The liquidity management is addressed through
creating a cash reserve, here denoted the liquidity
reserve Lt, which changes with ΔLt = Lt – Lt–1. The
liquidity reserve must not become negative at any point
in time during the project lifetime. As soon as Lt < 0,
there is insufficient cash available and the firm
experiences financial distress.
We calculate the free cash flow available for
shareholders after liquidity management as:
(13)
The change in liquidity reserve ΔLt depends on the
liquidity reserve still available in the ongoing year Lt,
the expectation of FCFEt+1 and the risk appetite of a
firm. In order to determine the required level of liquidity
FCFE FCFE Lt
LM
t t= + Δ ,
FCFE R C T Dt t t t t t= − − − +θ ,
reserve Lt to avoid financial distress in the following
year with sufficient probability, we apply a quantile
computation analogous to the Value-at-Risk (VaR)
calculation:
(14)
where η is the level exceeded by FCFEt+1 at confidence
level α ε [0,1]. We define Lt = max{0,–η}. If η is
positive, no liquidity reserve is required since the free
cash flow is almost certainly positive and thus sufficient
to satisfy all payment obligations. In contrast, a negative
η implies that liquidity reserves are necessary to prevent
financial distress.
We determine η by Monte Carlo simulations on
FCFEt. Assuming for example that the firm strives to
avoid financial distress with a probability of a = 99.73%
(the three-sigma rule), financial distress may only occur
in 0.27% of the simulation paths in any year. From the
simulation results, we determine η as the 0.27%-quantile
of FCFEt +1, from which we then derive the required
liquidity reserve Lt. Depending on the level of the
liquidity reserve in the previous year Lt−1, we
subsequently determine the required change in reserve
ΔLt. We also undertake a sensitivity analysis for a
financial distress probability of a = 95.45% (two-sigma).
After having determined the necessary liquidity
reserve for each year, an additional set of Monte Carlo
simulations must be undertaken for FCFEtLM. In
outcomes where FCFEt+1 realises as FCFEt+1 > η, the
excess reserve is paid out to the shareholders in each
year, so that no cash is held in the firm other than the
reserve required for the subsequent year. In outcomes
where the liquidity reserve was not sufficient in a year,
i.e. where FCFEt+1 realises as FCFEt+1 < η, the firm is
assumed to immediately default. As a simplification we
model this as if from this year onwards, all future cash
flows in the defaulting simulation path become zero.
This implies that we do not consider any final financial
settlements and consider neither additional equity
obligations nor pay-outs after bankruptcy of the firm. 
3.5. Model outputs: Shareholder Value and Support
payments
The Shareholder Value is then determined as:
(15)SHV FCFE
r
t
LM
e
t
t
T
=
+
=
∑ ( ) ,10
η α αα= = − < −− + +Q FCFE P FCFEq t t( ) { : ( )},1 11 1sup
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The free cash flows available for shareholders after
liquidity management FCFEtLM are discounted with the
cost of equity re, which is described in Section 3.6.
The support payments are determined from a socio-
economic perspective, as they are borne by all electricity
consumers or tax payers. They are calculated differently
for each support scheme:
For FIP schemes with a fixed market add-on, the
support level is straightforward: It directly corresponds to
the guaranteed premium. The net present value of support
payments (NSP) is for each simulation path calculated as
the sum of the discounted yearly support payments, which
corresponds directly to the project revenues from support:
(16)
where we use the risk-free rate rf to reflect the social
time preference rateii . This ensures also a consistent
comparison of the different cases.
For FIT schemes, the support payments have to be
determined as difference between the guaranteed tariff
and the market price:
(17)
This relies on the following assumptions: (1) the market
value of the electricity produced under the FIT
corresponds to the current market price St, (2) this value is
fully realised by the off-taking entity, and (3) the revenue
from its market sales is entirely used to counterbalance the
cost of support. Otherwise, the total support costs would
depend on further factors and could not be calculated
based on the market prices only. Note that potentially, in
years where the market price lies above the guaranteed
price level, the FIT support costs can be below zero. 
To obtain the equivalent FIT support level in real terms
that is directly comparable with the FIP support level, the
total support payments NSPFIT are then divided by the total
production and an equivalent real per unit price is
computed using an annuity factor.
3.6. Estimating beta and the support scheme-specific
cost of capital
As mentioned above, we use the CAPM to describe the
impact of systematic risk on the required return on
NSP
q FIP S
r
FIP
t t
f
t
t
T
=
−( )
+( )=∑ 11 ,
NSP q FIP
r
FIP
t
f
t
t
T
=
+( )=∑ 11 ,
equity. The expected rate of return on equity re is
estimated by the CAPM as [15]:
(18)
where rf is the risk-free rate, rm is the market return, and
βe is the equity beta.
Risk-free rate rf and market return rm are general (not
firm-specific) indicators and can be estimated by
adequate long term government bonds and market indices
(such as the S&P500, Eurostoxx or DAX). Equity beta βe
describes to what extent the risks of a firm (in occurrence
a project) are correlated with general market risks.
Generally, βe is derived from historical observations
using a two-step procedure: First, an asset beta βa is
determined from historical returns (on shares) using Eq.
(19):
(19)
This procedure can easily be applied for firms with
publicly quoted stocks, using historical time series of
their stock prices. However, we are not dealing with a
stock-listed company but a specific investment project.
We thus have to derive historical equivalent returns by
creating a time series of profits for each support type.
Since the price for FIT consists of a fixed tariff, there is
no variation in market prices. For FIP schemes, we
create a time series from historical power prices, the
fixed premium and a fixed level of operation and
maintenance cost and depreciation. This reflects typical
FIP 'profits', from which the returns can be derived.
Using Eq. (19), asset beta βa can be derived, comparing
the obtained time series to the market index. Since the
FIP time series becomes more or less volatile depending
on the level of the fixed premium, the asset beta changes
with the support level granted. This should be accounted
for in any model application.
Second, βa needs to be re-leveraged to βe based on
specific firm characteristics, i.e. debt/equity-ratio 
and tax rate rT, using Eq. (20) [26, p.713]:
(20)
The resulting 'geared' beta βe can be used to calculate
the cost of equity using Eq. (18).
β βe a Tr DE= +
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i and not - as often done - using an Euler scheme, see [21]
ii How societal risk preferences should be reflected in the used discounting factor requires further investigation. As the NSP serves subsequently only as a
relative measure for comparing different support schemes, we leave this question for further research.
For the data analysis, we use the closing price of each
trading day from a (stock) market index and compare it
to a closing price of forward electricity prices, which are
then adjusted according to the support scheme. Here,
closing prices of short term electricity forwards (e.g.
one-year ahead) are used as basis, acknowledging that
the life-time value of a project does not only depend on
short term electricity forwards, but on the longer term
electricity price evolution. Yet data and our empirical
estimation of the power price model suggest that one-
year ahead power futures already strongly correlate with
the long-term price expectations. Therefore, changes in
forward prices reflect changes in project value and can
be compared to asset prices from stock markets.
4. CASE APPLICATION: OFFSHORE WIND
PROJECT
Applying the developed model to a specific case, we
chose a typical offshore wind project in the German
Baltic Sea. We first introduce the assumptions taken for
the cash flow analysis, then proceed to the beta analysis,
and finally present the case results.
4.1. Cash flow analysis
As basis for the cash flow analysis, we make a number
of assumptions related to the design choices of the
support schemes, the stochastic processes, and project
specific characteristics.
4.1.1. Support schemes
As mentioned in Section 1, feed-in tariffs and premiums
are the two support schemes that are highly relevant in
the current European discussion of energy policy
development. We thus compare the two in our case.
We assume the FIT scheme to be a traditional price
guarantee. This means that an operator of a renewable
project receives a pre-determined, fixed price for each
unit of electricity generated, independent of the market
price. We do not allow temporary or permanent opting-
out of the FIT scheme. We see this as simplification, as in
some circumstances an opting-out might be attractive,
e.g. when the market price becomes structurally higher
than the guaranteed tariff. Such analysis is not in focus of
our study, but it might be relevant for future investigation.
We assume the FIP scheme to be a pre-determined,
fixed add-on to the market price for each unit of
electricity generated. Neither the FIT nor the FIP prices
are assumed to be index-regulated, i.e. they do not
increase with inflation but remain constant in nominal
terms. In order to increase the transparency of results we
assume that the support in both cases is granted
throughout the project lifetime. We do not ex ante assume
a support level. We rather determine the minimum
required support levels in each scheme through
simulation.
4.1.2. Calibration of the price processes
The two-factor Schwartz and Smith model is calibrated
to the German power market. As basis for the calibration
we use German power forwards (Phelix Futures), more
specifically the closing price on each trading day
between October 2003 and September 2013 [27]. The
relevant prices of the 1-year Forwards and 5-year
Forwards are shown in Figure 2. Since the focus of the
paper is not on advanced econometric estimation, we
use rather straightforward calibration techniques for
deriving the parameter values.
For the long term process the drift and volatility
parameters μξ and αξ have to be estimated. We use 
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Figure 2: Historical power prices, weekly, 1-year and 5-year Forwards from the German market (EEX), and the corresponding short-term
and long term model processes, [27] and own calculations
5-year Forwards as proxy, since these represent the
longest time horizon on the German power market with
at least some trading volume on a continuous basis. αξ is
estimated as the standard deviation of price differences
Δξt = ln (S
_
t) − ln (S
_
t−1) where S
_
t is represented by the
weekly time series of the 5-year Forward over ten years
(from mid-2003 to mid-2013). The drift 
is estimated by taking the average of, Δξt = ln (S
_
t) − ln
(S
_
t−1) and hence μξ can be analytically derived from the
formula. In a last step, the parameters must be
annualised from weekly values using a factor of ,
whereby Δt =1/52. We arrive at an annual drift of μξ =
0.00148 and volatility of σξ = 0.11402. As starting value
S
_
0 for the simulation, we take the closing price of the
last traded 5-year Forward of our time series, i.e. from
week 36 in 2013, and obtain S
_
0 = 37.65 EUR/MWh.
For the short term process mean reversion coefficient
κ, volatility parameter σχ, and correlation parameter ρχξ
have to be estimated. We estimate κ from an ordinary
least squares regression analysis of the time series 
Δχt = χt − χt−1 with χt−1 = ln(S
_
t −1). From the resulting
weekly coefficient α , the annualised mean reversion rate is
derived using the relation (cf. Eq. (10)). We 
obtain κ = 0.5377. In an alternative approach
based on Skorodumov [28] that uses the property
of 1/2 be made with a diagonal line
mean-reverting process for estimating the 
mean reversion and a graphical  analysis of the price
process, we would arrive at a similar level of κ = 0.4806.
We derive σχ by making use of the closed-form solution
of the process, as described by Davis [21]:
(21)
We estimate Var [χt +Δt] from our time series through
least squares linear regression. Inserting all parameters
into Eq. (21), we find σχ = 0.0976. To estimate ρχξ, we
apply the standard statistical approach, using
, where we have n =520
observations. The correlation is estimated to be
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ρχξ = 0.1073. As starting value S0 for the simulation, we
take the closing price of the last traded 1-year Forward
of our time series, and obtain S0 = 37.28 EUR/MWh.
4.1.3.  Calibration of the wind distribution
The wind model is calibrated to a historical wind index.
The most comprehensive set of data available is from
Denmark [29], which is a set of monthly values from
1979 to 2013. Since our model is based on annual
considerations, we aggregate the data into yearly values.
We assume that this data set is also applicable for a
location in the German Baltic Sea.
As described in Section 3.3, the Weibull distribution is
determined by scale parameter λ and shape parameter k.
We use the maximum likelihood method for estimating
the parameters, and obtain λ = 103.6 and k = 12.05. The
wind index obtained from the Weibull distribution is then
multiplied with the expected annual wind production.
We estimate the expected annual wind production to be
4,040 MWh/MW at 100% availability, which is the
expected average for a typical new large offshore wind
park in the Baltic Sea, such as Kriegers Flak [30]. At
96% availability, the expected electricity exported to the
grid is estimated at 3,878 MWh/MW per year.
4.1.4.  Project specific cost assumptions
The required project specific assumptions are
investment cost, operational cost, project lifetime,
depreciation rules, and income tax rate. Table 1
summarises all estimates.
We estimate investment costs based on an average of
the historical investment cost of all 45 commercial
offshore wind parks in Europe (data collected from
[31]). Furthermore, we expect additional project
financing cost, which we estimate based on information
given in [32]. Total upfront capital expenditures are thus
estimated to be 3.87 million EUR/MW.
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Table 1: Project specific cost assumptions, based on [30-33] and
own calculations
Investment cost 3.01 mEUR/MW
Additional financing cost 0.86 mEUR/MW
Operational cost 106.8 kEUR/MW/y
Lifetime 20 years
Depreciation straight line, 20 years
Income tax rate 28.1%
Empirical values for operational costs of offshore
wind parks in Europe range from 20.2 EUR/MWh to
36.7 EUR/MWh (2010 prices) [31, p.80]. In reality, the
operational costs are partially fixed and partially
dependent on the production volume. We simplify by
assuming fixed annual cost. We use the average value of
source [33] transferred to 2014-prices and a per-MW-
value, arriving at a fixed annual cost of 106.8 kEUR/MW.
The income tax rate in Germany comprises 15%
corporate tax, 0.825% solidarity levy, and a local trade tax,
which depends on the municipality the offshore wind park
is assigned to. The federal State of Schleswig-Holstein e.g.
suggests that local trade tax from offshore wind parks is to
be paid out to the municipality of Helgoland [34], with a
local tax rate of 12.25%. In total, we arrive at an income
tax rate of 28.1%.
4.1.5. Assumptions on debt financing cost
Valuable information on financing of existing offshore
wind parks in Europe can be found in [32] and [33]. In
Table 2, we present some relevant data for the (rather
limited) experiences in Germany.
From the data of existing German projects, we can
expect a debt share between 60% and 70%. Since this is
such a decisive assumption for the case, we analyse
different debt shares, while focussing most on the results
within this range.
We assume that the project can obtain a 15-year loan.
The total interest rate consists of a bank margin (2.5% to
>3%), added to a (risk-free) reference rate. As reference
rate, the interest rates for 10-year German government
bonds can be usediii. The 'Bund 14' was at 1.66% in
January 2014 [35]. Often, a swap premium is also added
(typically 0.2% to 0.5%) [32]. We hence estimate the
total interest rate to be 5.21%, consisting of 1.66%
reference rate, 3.25% margin and 0.3% swap premium.
4.2. Beta analysis and cost of equity
As described in Section 3.6, we start the beta analysis by
determining the asset beta. We undertake the analysis
based on historical developments of the DAX index
[36], as compared to returns composed of support
payments and German one-year power forwards (Phelix
Futures) on a daily level [27]. Annual costs are deducted
from the returns, as described above. We have ten years
of consistent data, from October 2003 to September
2013, with data on each trading day. Power price data
before 2003 are not considered as being sufficiently
reliable because of limited market liquidity in the first
years after liberalisation.
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Table 2: Financial data of real offshore wind parks in Germany [32, p.73]
Financial Capacity Cost Gearing Tenor (Loan
Close Project (MW) (mEUR) (Debt share) maturity) (years) Margin
2011 Globaltech 1 400 1850 58% 15 3%
2011 Meerwind 288 1200 69% 15 2.5-3%
2010 Borkum West 200 780 59% 2+15 >3%
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Figure 3: Historical wind production index, annual, 1979-2013 [29], and the fitted Weibull distribution
iii German government bonds with 15 year duration are rather exceptional. Therefore 10-year bonds are used as best available approximation.
From time series analysis, we find a positive
correlation of the market index and the power prices. A
FIT scheme, which eliminates this positive correlation
through a fixed price guarantee, is expected to have an
asset beta of zero. This can certainly be seen as a
simplification, but is theoretically consistent in our
approach. A FIP scheme partially decreases the positive
correlation, to an amount depending on the support level:
The higher the support level, and thus the fixed part of
the income, the lower the correlation of return with the
market. Figure 4 shows the results of our analysis.
Depending on the support level, we are now able to
determine the beta, using the relationship depicted in
Figure 4. In order to estimate the equity beta βe, we re-
leverage the betas using Eq. (20), specifically for each
support level. For example, a FIP of 50 EUR/MWh
corresponds to approximately 150% of the long-term
average market price. The asset beta amounts to βa =
0.11 and the corresponding equity beta is then βe = 0.24,
with 28.1% tax rate and 60% debt share.
The results of our analysis correspond roughly to the
findings of [32], who estimate that the introduction of a
FIT mechanism in the UK will result in a 0.1 reduction
of the asset beta.
We obtain the overall cost of equity by applying Eq.
(18). Here, we make a restriction: We assume that the
cost of equity applied in the project appraisal cannot be
lower than the total interest rate of the loan obtained for
the project plus a margin. This reflects rational decision
making by shareholders who would not accept a lower
expected rate of return for their equity than the cost of
debt. In fact, as the equity in a project involves greater
risks than the debt, there should be a positive margin
between the cost of equity and the cost of debt. We
estimate this margin to be 2%, which is a conservative
assumption when compared to Wallasch et al. [37, p.99]
and to [32] where differences between cost of equity and
cost debt amount 4–7%.
4.3. Results of the case application
We apply all above described assumptions and run the
model with 5000 Monte Carlo simulations. In the
presentation of results, we focus on the required support
levels (in EUR/MWh), as introduced in Section 3.5. The
support levels are set so that in each case, an expected
Shareholder Value of zero is reached, which is assumed
to be the threshold of investment. For illustration, we
also show the probability distributions of total support
payments (kEUR/MW) over the project lifetime and
corresponding Shareholder Values (kEUR/MW).
4.3.1. Results for different debt shares
Because the debt shares are a crucial assumption with
significant impact on the results, we present the results
over the whole range of gearing, i.e. debt shares between
0% and 100%, in Figure 5. For comparison, debt shares
between 58-69% have been achieved for offshore wind
parks in the past (see Section 4.1.5). One could expect
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Figure 5: Case results for the whole range of debt shares, required support levels in EUR/MWh (left) and capital required for liquidity
management in kEUR/MW (right)
that the FIT can achieve higher debt shares than a FIP,
because of the more stable cash flows.
In our results, the FIT scheme requires support levels
between 97.3 EUR/MWh and 78.8 EUR/MWh,
constantly decreasing with increasing debt shares. At
very high debt shares, the liquidity reserves have to
become extremely high to prevent financial distress. This
is, because the debt service is becoming higher while the
fixed part of the revenues becomes lower with decreasing
support levels. We would have expected to find an
optimum gearing of below 100% debt share - this is not
the case in our settings, most likely due to several risk
factors which we do not model in the cash flows (such as
e.g. risk of technical failures, which would always lead to
some safety margin in the loan structure).
The FIP scheme requires support levels between 100.6
EUR/MWh and 87.4 EUR/MWh, decreasing first with
higher debt shares and then increasing again, so that we
find an optimum gearing at approximately 82.5% debt.
The increase in required support level is due to the higher
cost of liquidity management, which affects the FIP
much more than the FIT scheme, because of the
additional revenue uncertainty due to fluctuating prices.
Taking the range of debt shares between 20% and
90% into account (which is more realistic than the whole
range), the difference in support levels required by the
schemes are between 3.5 EUR/MWh and 8.3
EUR/MWh, corresponding to 4-10% of total support
paid. As expected, the FIP scheme requires higher
support levels than the FIT scheme, due to the higher
risk exposure and consequently higher variation in
shareholder values. Figure 6 illustrates this on the left
hand side. On the other hand, the support payments
show higher variations under a FIT scheme. Note that
the evaluation of the variability of support payments is
not within the scope of our analysis.
Comparing these results to the literature, we find that
they are comparable to previous analyses. For example
Kitzing [38] arrived for a Danish offshore case at a
difference in required support levels of 5-10 EUR/MWh
between FIT and FIP, however using a different
approach, which is based on a mean-variance analysis
and thus not fully comparable to this liquidity
management approach.
For debt shares lower than 82.5%, the FIT scheme
requires (as expected) fewer liquidity reserves than the
FIP scheme. For example at 70% debt share, the cost of
holding the reserve has a present value of 88 kEUR/MW
under the FIP scheme, which corresponds to 53 million
EUR for a wind park of 600 MW. Here, the FIT scheme
would require 4 million EUR fewer liquidity reserves.
The difference is, however, surprisingly small. We thus
investigate the significance of the liquidity management
further in Section 4.3.2.
4.3.2. The effect of liquidity management
In order to test the significance of liquidity management
for the results, we analyse the results of a case with
liquidity management as compared to a case in which no
liquidity management is undertaken. For the latter we
assume that the firm can tolerate negative cash holdings,
e.g. through a bank agreement with short term loans or
through a mother company guarantee. We investigate
the effect based on the example of 70% debt share.
Table 3 compares all relevant results for this case.
It becomes apparent that the required support levels
increase through liquidity management, e.g. for FIP
from 85.4 EUR/MWh to 88.0 EUR/MWh. This is due to
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Figure 6: Distribution of simulation outcomes for shareholder value and support payments, for a debt share of 70%
the cost related to holding the liquidity reserves. The
difference in required support increases though only by
0.1 EUR/MWh, corresponding to approximately 2% of the
effect. A factor that makes the liquidity management seem
less significant is the opposing effects of liquidity
management and beta: Because support levels are
increased through liquidity management and thus the share
of fixed income increases, the beta is reduced for FIP, in the
case of 70% debt share from 0.217 to 0.208 (see the
relationship depicted in Figure 4). Therefore, the difference
in cost of capital between the two schemes decreases,
which works in favour of the FIP scheme. Without this
decrease in beta the difference in support levels between
the FIT and the FIP scheme would have increased to 5.0
EUR/MWh. This was, however, overshadowed by the
effect from the beta reduction before. 
Taking all of this into account we conclude that in our
investigated cases most of the difference in support level
stems from systematic risk, modelled through the beta
differences. There is, however, also a small and continuous
effect from liquidity management throughout the whole
range of debt shares. The liquidity management
counterbalances some reduction effects from changes in
beta that could otherwise have led to an underestimation of
the differences in required support level. Therefore, it is
crucial to consider both elements in the analysis.
Note that we determine the cost of capital only once in
the calculation, i.e. we use a constant debt share for each
scenario. This implies that additional capital injections
through liquidity management do not affect the discount
rate, which is a simplification. In our cases, the
additionally required capital makes on average 3-7% of
the injected equityiv. Within this range, we find it
acceptable as an approximation to operate with constant
cost of capital. Since the FIP scheme generally requires
higher additional capital, it would also be affected more
by a dynamic determination of the cost of capital. The
difference between the two instruments would then
increase somewhat.
4.3.3. Sensitivity analysis
Because the debt shares are a crucial assumption with
significant impact on the results, we have shown results
for the whole range of debt shares above. 
Another factor especially important for the liquidity
management is the assumption what probability
threshold a firm applies when it comes to avoidance of
financial distress. In the above analysis, we have
assumed a rather strong avoidance probability of
99.73% (the three-sigma rule). When relaxing this
assumption to two sigma, i.e. allowing financial distress
with a probability of 95.45%, the capital required for
liquidity reserves decreases substantially. Taking a debt
share of 60% as example, the present value of liquidity
reserves decreases from 39 kEUR/MW to 2 kEUR/MW,
on average over all Monte Carlo simulations.
5. DISCUSSION
5.1. Comparison to the actual EEG tariffs
The German Renewable Energies Act (EEG) provides
two different options of feed-in tariffs for offshore wind
parks starting operation before January 2018:
1. An initial tariff of 150 EUR/MWh for 12 years
plus a tariff of 35 EUR/MWh for the remaining
8 years;
2. An initial tariff of 190 EUR/MWh for 8 years
('optional acceleration model') plus a tariff of 35
EUR/MWh for the remaining 12 years.
The period for the initial tariff of 150 EUR/MWh is
extended by 0.5 months for every nautical mile of
distance to shore outside the 12-mile zone, and by 1.7
months for each metre of water depth exceeding 20
metres. We estimate that a park with a distance to shore
and water depth typical for German offshore wind parks
currently under development could realistically achieve
14 years of the higher initial tariff of 150 EUR/MWh,
and then 6 years at 35 EUR/MWh.
Applying these tariff levels in our model, we obtain
an internal rate of return for the project of 6.4%, which
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Table 3: Required support levels and their differences with and without liquidity management, for 70% debt share, in EUR/MWh
Without Liquidity With Liquidity
Management Management
Support instrument FIT FIP FIT FIP
Required equiv. support level 80.7 85.4 83.2 88.0
Difference in support level 4.7 4.8
iv The most extreme case in the Monte Carlo simulation resulted in 19.1% increased equity.
is in line with the rates of return of 7-9% that the
German government assumes reasonable for wind parks
(at somewhat higher assumptions on cost of debt) (see
[37]). Hence, our model overall aligns with what is
underlying official government policy in Germany.
In a next validation step, we compare the EEG tariff
levels to our calculated ones, using the indicator of
discounted net support payments over the whole lifetime
of the project. These amount to 3.7 million EUR/MW for
the EEG tariffs as compared to 3.4 to 3.5 million
EUR/MW in our cases. We thus arrive at support
payments that are equivalent to 92-95% of the actual EEG
levels. Hence, our modelled tariffs of 121.2 to 125.3
EUR/MWh (that are assumed constant over 20 years) are
comparable to the actual EEG tariffs (that are stepping
down from 150 to 35 EUR/MWh after the initial period).
5.2. Model assumptions and their consequences
We have made several crucial assumptions and
simplifications. We have focussed on financial distress
and related issues and have not treated other risks more
than by introducing an add-on to the cost of equity
reflecting some of these risks. We have focussed on a
single investment and do not consider portfolio effects. If
portfolios would be considered, one can expect that
required support costs would be decreased - in that sense
we have calculated a maximum range of required support
levels. On the other hand, portfolios could also change the
risk exposure of investors and thus the risk implications
between FIT and FIP. Our approach cannot capture these
effects. Investigating this remains to further research.
We assume for transparency reasons and
comparability of results that there is no opt-out option of
the feed-in tariff scheme. However, we can see from our
case simulations that in 4.7% of the price scenarios, a
price occurs exceeding the lowest FIT level (of 121.2
EUR/MWh). In these situations, a RES-E producer
would opt-out of the FIT scheme and transfer into
normal market operation had he the opportunity to do
so. This has some consequences on our estimation of
support payments because they are estimated as the
difference between guaranteed tariff and market price
and can become negative. Had the FIT producer the
option to leave the FIT scheme whenever the market
price exceeds the tariff (and maybe even return to the
FIT at a later point in time), no instances of negative
support payments could occur. In this case, the netting
approach adopted here would underestimate the overall
support payments related to a FIT.
Assumptions regarding project-specific costs are also
decisive for the results. We have used average values for
all estimations. Specific parks can lie significantly
higher or lower than that. This will have an effect on the
required support levels and also on the absolute
differences. However, since support schemes are usually
not designed for single projects but a whole sector, our
approach of taking an average wind park seems
reasonable. Additionally, it could also be beneficial to
test the consequences for a marginal park, i.e. the most
expensive wind energy investment necessary to reach
deployment targets.
The choice of power price process and its calibration
also affects the results. Especially seasonal variations
and jumps could have been modelled. However, we do
not expect that incorporating these into the model would
lead to significant changes in the comparative
conclusions, because of the long time horizon of the
analysis. We have confirmed that moderate changes in
parameters of the short term process do not have any
significant effect on the conclusions.
An issue still to be analysed is the consequences of
having two different distribution types. The wind
production model uses a Weibull distribution whereas
the power prices are assumed lognormal. Since the cash
flows under the FIT scheme only depend on the wind
production and not the power prices, the results under
the two support schemes FIT and FIP are affected
differently by the two distribution types. Especially the
skewness factor differs between the two schemes.
Whether this affects the comparison of the support
schemes depends on the risk preferences of the decision
makers. Here, further investigations are needed.
5.3. Implications for policy makers
The model and insights generated in this study can help
policy makers to determine appropriate support levels
for renewable support schemes. While we do not assume
that support instruments are designed for individual
investors, we use the case of a single investment as case
to demonstrate the impacts that different support scheme
designs have on required support levels. We have
shown that similar differences occur over the whole
range of gearing (i.e. debt shares), so we can assume
that most investors would be affected in a similar way. 
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The insight about impacts on required support levels
is especially relevant when switching from a certain
support scheme to another, e.g. from a FIT to a FIP
scheme. Then, the net support levels of the FIT cannot
be directly transferred to the new scheme - they must be
adjusted upwards to ensure continued adequacy of
investment incentives.
In the recent past, policy makers in Europe are
becoming more and more concerned with the burden of
support schemes on consumers [39]. Policy making
strives to limit total support costs to a minimum that can
still provide the desired deployment of new renewable
projects. In this, policy makers should be aware of the
connection between required support level and risk
exposure: The higher the risk exposure, the higher the
required support level. As this analysis illustrates with a
quantitative case, the effect of both systematic risk and
unsystematic risk should not be neglected in policy
making.
5.4. Further development of the approach
In a first step, it could be beneficial to test the significance
of several assumptions made. First, the loan maturity
could influence the results significantly. We expect that
the shorter the duration of the loan, the smaller the
difference between the support schemes. Second, with
technology development and further decreases in overall
cost of offshore wind, also the support levels are expected
to decrease. It could thus be beneficial to make a similar
analysis with reduced support levels. We expect that the
lower the support levels are, the larger the difference
between the FIT and FIP scheme becomes, as volatile
market prices become more dominant in the FIP case.
As the results are very sensitive to the assumed debt
share, it would be of great advantage if these were not set
exogenously, but could be determined endogenously.
This could be e.g. done on the basis of probabilistic
analysis of deficits in debt service, and limiting them to a
certain level. We expect that here, the FIT could achieve
higher debt shares, due to the more stable income flows.
Additionally, the model could be further expanded to
cover other support instruments, such as tradable green
certificate systems with quotas.
6. CONCLUSION
This study contributes to the analysis of risk
implications from policy instruments in several ways:
First, we developed a multi-year approach to liquidity
management in a firm in order to capture effects of
exposure to unsystematic risks. Second, we adapted the
framework to wind energy investment projects. Third,
we quantified the policy consequences of choosing
between feed-in tariffs and premiums for a specific case.
In an application case for a German offshore wind
park in the Baltic Sea, we estimated that a FIP scheme
would require a 3.5 to 8.3 EUR/MWh higher support
level in order to give the same investment incentive as a
comparable FIT. This corresponds to about 4-10% of the
total support payments. As for most case specific
analysis, these values are very much dependent on the
assumptions taken. We find, however, that they show
very illustratively that there is a systematic difference
between support levels required for FIT and FIP,
respectively, and that the difference can be significant.
While the focus of the analysis in this paper is only on
certain risk aspects and does not evaluate the general
benefits or disadvantages of different policy
instruments, it does provide additional insights for
policy makers about how to determine support levels.
We find that risk implications have a significant
influence on required support levels and thus should be
taken into consideration when support policies are
chosen and the respective support levels are determined.
Otherwise, support levels might not be set at an
adequate level, and the investment incentives
experienced on the market could be quite different than
what was intended by policy makers. This could lead to
under-investment on the one hand, so that RES-E targets
may not be achieved, or to over-investment on the other,
so that total support cost are not easily predicted or
controlled.
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